The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship
& the Law
Volume 2

Issue 2

4-20-2009

Rural Banking: Designing an Effective Legal Framework for
Microfinance
Ian Davis

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jbel
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ian Davis, Rural Banking: Designing an Effective Legal Framework for Microfinance, 2 J. Bus.
Entrepreneurship & L. Iss. 2 (2009)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jbel/vol2/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law by an
authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Article 5

RURAL BANKING: DESIGNING AN
EFFECTIVE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
MICROFINANCE
IAN DAVIS1
I.Introduction to Microfinance .............................................................................. 395
II.Microfinance Regulation and Supervision ........................................................ 398
A. Challenges for microfinance regulation ............................................ 401
B. Benefits to microfinance regulation .................................................. 404
III.Aspects of a Sound Legal Framework for Microfinance ................................. 406
A. Microfinance services should be integrated with the formal
financial sector .................................................................................. 406
B. Regulation should be based on a tiered approach ............................. 409
C. The framework should facilitate an easy transition from NGO to
formalized bank ................................................................................. 412
1. Example of K-Rep Bank ............................................................. 413
2. Example of BancoSol ................................................................. 414
D. There should be no interest rate cap .................................................. 416
IV.The Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006 ......................................................... 419
V.Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 423
Approximately 1.2 billion people live in extreme poverty, surviving on less
than $1 per day.2 In emerging markets, commercial banks generally serve only ten
to twenty percent of the population, excluding eighty to ninety percent of the
population from the formal financial sector.3 Many in this “un-banked” population
could benefit from access to financial services.
In most developing countries, rural financial markets are based partially on a
foundation of law and partially on a non-legal foundation of extra-legal (and
sometimes illegal) activities.4 These legal and non-legal foundations directly
1
2009 JD candidate and Fellow of the Geoffrey H. Palmer Center for Entrepreneurship & the Law
at Pepperdine University School of Law.
2
ROBERT PECK CHRISTEN & DOUGLAS PEARCE, CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR
(CGAP), MANAGING RISKS AND DESIGNING PRODUCTS FOR AGRICULTURAL MICROFINANCE:
FEATURES OF AN EMERGING MODEL 1 (2005), http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2705/
OccasionalPaper_11.pdf.
3
See MARGUERITE S. ROBINSON, THE MICROFINANCE REVOLUTION: SUSTAINABLE FINANCE FOR
THE POOR 6 (World Bank Publication 2001).
4
HEYWOOD W. FLEISIG & NURIA DE LA PEÑA, LEGAL AND REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR
EFFECTIVE RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 1 (Ctr. for the Econ. Analysis of Law 2003). This principle is
illustrated in detailed fashion in HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (Basic Books 2000). De Soto explains that
most businesses in developing economies function in the extra-legal sphere, meaning they do not enjoy
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influence the operation of rural financial institutions.5 This comment will discuss
the intersection between rural finance and legal systems. The focus of the paper
will be on an emerging legal issue in developing countries: integration of
microfinance institutions with the formal legal framework. The comment argues
that the benefits of microfinance regulation outweigh the costs and is divided into
four sections: The first section is an introduction to microfinance; the second
section provides an overview of the issue of microfinance regulation;6 the third
section offers suggestions for specific aspects of a favorable legal framework for
microfinance;7 the final section analyzes an example of an effective microfinance
regulation law.8
I.

INTRODUCTION TO MICROFINANCE

Microfinance organizations aim to help individuals rise out of poverty.9
Providing access to credit for low income groups that have traditionally been
excluded from financial markets allows the poor to “expand and diversify their
legal protection and benefits since they are not registered as legal entities. De Soto describes the
predicament: “[e]xtralegal businesses are taxed by the lack of good property law and continually having
to hide their operations from the authorities. Because they are not incorporated, extralegal
entrepreneurs cannot lure investors by selling shares; they cannot secure low-interest formal credit
because they do not even have legal addresses.” Id. at 155.
5
FLEISIG & DE LA PEÑA, supra note 4, at 1. The legal structure of rural financial institutions
influences the institutions’ legitimacy and ability to operate efficiently. Additionally, if institutions
operate in the extra-legal sphere, they live in fear of government detection. See DE SOTO, supra note 4,
at 155. De Soto states that such fear makes it difficult for institutions to reach their potential, as
“underground entrepreneurs cannot openly advertise to build up their clientele or make less costly bulk
deliveries to customers.” Id.
6

See infra note 34.

7

See infra note 104.

8

See infra note 199.

9

The website of Unitus, a leader in the microfinance industry, provides an overview of the history
of microfinance:
Microfinance emerged in the 1970s as social innovators began to offer financial
services to the working poor — those who were previously considered “unbankable” because of their lack of collateral. Once given the opportunity, not
only did clients of [microfinance institutions] expand their businesses and
increase their incomes, but their high repayment rates demonstrated that the poor
are capable of transforming their own lives given the chance. This model of
lending disproved all conventional thinking. Microfinance was born. Since then,
microfinance has become one of the most sustainable and effective tools in the
fight against global poverty.
Unitus, The Microfinance Solution, http://www.unitus.com/unitus-in-action/background-poverty-andmicrofinance/the-microfinance-solution (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
Further, the Unitus website briefly explains the fundamentals of microfinance:
The most common microfinance product is a microcredit loan — usually less
than $100. These tiny loans are enough for hardworking micro-entrepreneurs to
start or expand small businesses such as weaving baskets, raising chickens, or
buying wholesale products to sell in a market. Income from these businesses
provides better food, housing, health care and education for entire families, and
most important, additional income provides hope for a better future.
Id. Unless otherwise indicated, this paper refers only to microfinance in developing countries.
Microfinance in wealthy countries presents drastically different issues.
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economic activity, increase their incomes, and improve their self-confidence.”10
The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, a World Bank sponsored consortium of
globally respected donors, explains:
Empirical evidence shows that, among the poor, those participating in microfinance
programs who had access to financial services were able to improve their wellbeing both at the individual and household level much more than those who did not
have access to financial services.11

Access to microfinance services can broaden the economic opportunities
available to many individuals of the developing world. The only alternative
sources of financial services to many who are excluded by the formal sector are
informal money lenders and loan sharks.12 Such lenders take advantage of the
plight of the poor and charge exorbitant interest rates that are typically five to
twenty times higher than most microfinance organizations.13
Many empirical studies demonstrate the positive effects of microfinance
programs.14 Microfinance programs have proven effective at increasing incomes
and reducing vulnerability.15 Research indicates that such financial benefits also
lead to a positive social impact.16 Microfinance programs typically target women,
and studies have demonstrated that such access to financial services has improved
the status of women:
There is strong evidence that access to financial services and the resultant transfer
of financial resources to poor women, over time, lead to women becoming more
confident and assertive. Access to finance enables poor women to become
economic agents of change by increasing their income and productivity, access to
markets and information, and decision-making power.17

The strong body of evidence demonstrating its positive impact has led
microfinance to garner much support. Muhammad Yunus, pioneer of the
microfinance movement and founder of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, was

10

ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 37.

11

CGAP, http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.26.1306/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).

12

Informal money lenders and loan sharks are individual lenders who conduct transactions directly
with their clients. See A.C. KULSHRESHTHA, TREATMENT OF INFORMAL SECTOR FINANCIAL
ACTIVITIES
INCLUDING
OWN
MONEY
LENDERS
IN
THE
SNA
1
(2004),
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/AEG/papers/m4MoneyLendersKulsh.pdf. Their clients are
typically the poor and illiterate members of society who have no hope of qualifying for a loan from
commercial sources. Id.
13

ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 16-17.

14

See Jonathan Morduch, Analysis of the Effects of Microfinance on Poverty Reduction (NYU
Wagner Working Paper Series, Paper No. 1014, 2002) (Providing a helpful overview of such studies).
15

See ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 9.

16

See responsAbility Social Investment Services AG, The Social Impact of Microfinance and How
to Measure It, http://www.thinkmicrofinance.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/12/discuspaper2.pdf (last
visited Mar. 11, 2009).
17

CGAP, http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.26.1306/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
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awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.18 The United Nations legitimized the
effectiveness of microfinance by anointing 2005 as the “International Year of
Microcredit.”19 Each year, influential world leaders such as the Queen of Spain,
the Queen of Jordan, and the First Lady of South Africa attend conferences
organized by the Microcredit Summit Campaign.20
Globally, there are
approximately 3,000 microfinance organizations serving over 130 million poor
clients.21
While microfinance has expanded significantly, the movement remains far
from reaching its potential. After thirty years of industry effort, there is still a
large gap between the supply and demand for microfinance services.22 At current
growth rates, in 2010 there will still be 395 million un-served individuals who
desire access to microfinance.23 This slow growth is due to the fact that most
microfinance institutions (MFIs) rely on a limited pool of donor funds to finance
their operations.24 As MFIs move towards securing growth capital from financial
markets, they will be able to grow more rapidly.25 Favorable banking laws for
microfinance can play a key role in enabling MFIs to reach this objective.26
For decades, credit cooperatives and development finance institutions have

18

Dr. Yunus received the Nobel Peace Prize jointly with the Grameen Bank. See Nobelprize.org,
Peace 2006, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). In his
book, Banker to the Poor, Dr. Yunus recalls that in 1974 he was teaching economics at Chittagong
University in southern Bangladesh, when the country experienced terrible famine in which thousands
starved to death. MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BANKER TO THE POOR vii (1999). He noted that the thrill he
had once experienced from studying economics and teaching his students elegant theories that could
supposedly cure societal problems left him entirely unsatisfied. Id. at viii. Yunus visited the nearby
village of Jobra, where he learned the real-life economics of the poor. Id. at viii – ix. He wanted to
help, and he designed several plans. Id. at ix. One plan was more successful than the others: offering
poor individuals tiny loans for self-employment. Id. Grameen Bank was born and an economic
revolution had begun.
19

In furtherance of its efforts to reach the Millennium Development Goals, the UN launched a
year-long campaign to promote microfinance. The official UN website for the International Year of
Microcredit states, “[t]he Year of microcredit 2005 calls for inclusive financial sectors and
strengthening the powerful, but often untapped, entrepreneurial spirit existing in communities around
the world.” International Year of Microcredit 2005, http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org/ (last visited
Mar. 1, 2009).
20
The Microcredit Summit Campaign is a publicity campaign that works to “ensure that 175
million of the world's poorest families, especially the women of those families, are receiving credit for
self-employment and other financial and business services by the end of 2015.” Microcredit Summit
Campaign, http://www.microcreditsummit.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). In its efforts to achieve this
stated goal, the Microcredit Summit Campaign collects data from MFIs around the world and organizes
annual best-practice conferences. Id.
21
The statistics are based on published estimates from the Microcredit Summit Campaign. See
SAM DALEY-HARRIS, STATE OF THE MICROCREDIT CAMPAIGN REPORT 2007 (2007),
http://www.microcreditsummit.org/pubs/reports/socr/EngSOCR2007.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
22

See id.

23

This figure is based on CGAP data and population growth rates from the UN population division.
Unitus, www.unitus.com.
24

Id.

25

Id.; see infra note 90.

26

A substantial portion of this comment is dedicated to this issue. See infra section II.
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provided access to credit to customers that commercial banks have neglected.27
Legal charters govern the financial operations of these organizations and allow
them access to savings or other public sources of funding.28 During the past two
decades, many innovative methodologies for delivering microfinance services have
emerged.29 Development of such innovation has been led by non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), “who typically do not have a legal charter authorizing them
to engage in financial intermediation.”30
Currently, there is much discussion among governments, practitioners, and
donors about new legal structures for microfinance.31 Many countries have
regulatory laws specifically tailored to the microfinance sector.32 There are clear
costs and benefits to microfinance regulation.33 The following section provides an
overview of microfinance regulatory issues.
II.

MICROFINANCE REGULATION AND SUPERVISION

To reach large numbers of people, microfinance must operate through
institutions that are licensed and supervised by a country’s financial authorities.34
A licensed institution can offer savings services to its clients and increase its own

27
ROBERT PECK CHRISTEN & RICHARD ROSENBERG, CGAP, THE RUSH TO REGULATE: LEGAL
FRAMEWORKS FOR MICROFINANCE 1 (2000), http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2699/Occasional
Paper_04.pdf.
28

Id.

29

Id. Two leading microfinance models are the Grameen Bank model and the village banking
model. The Grameen Bank model consists of group lending, and was pioneered by the Grameen Bank.
See YUNUS, supra note 18; see also Grameen Bank, Credit Lending Markets, http://www.grameeninfo.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=43&Itemid=93 (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
Village banking is a lending methodology developed by FINCA International. See Glenn Westley,
Village Banking: Joining the Mainstream, 7 MICROENTERPRISE DEV. REV. 1, 1 (2004). A village bank
is an informal self-help support group of 20-30 members, predominantly female heads-of-household.
Id. at 2. These women meet once a week in the home of one of their members to avail themselves of
working capital loans, a safe place to save, skill training, mentoring, and motivation. See also FINCA,
Microfinance and Village Banking, http://www.villagebanking.org/site/c.erKPI2PCIoE/b.2394109/
k.BEA3/Home.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
30

CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 27, at 1.

31

See generally STEFAN STASCHEN, REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR MICROFINANCE: A
COMPARISON OF LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN 11 COUNTRIES WORLDWIDE (Eschborn 2003),
http://www.intercooperation.ch/finance/download/divers/staschen-comparision-between-countries.pdf.
See also RICHARD ROSENBERG ET AL, DONOR BRIEF NO. 12: REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF
MICROFINANCE (May 2003), http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.9.2415/.
32

For example, Uganda passed the Microfinance Deposit-taking Institution Act in 2003,
establishing a unit within the Bank of Uganda to regulate microfinance deposit-taking institutions
(MDIs). DAVID KALYANGO, UGANDA’S EXPERIENCE WITH THE REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY
FRAMEWORK FOR MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 9 (Bank of Uganda 2005). The act allows for wider
access to public funds and places minimum capital requirements of 15% of risk weighted assets on all
MDIs. Id. See generally STATSCHEN, supra note 31 (where the author compares the regulatory
frameworks and relevant laws in eleven countries).
33

See infra note 56.

34

ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 31, at 1.
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capital by capturing deposits.35 Microfinance is substantially different from
conventional banking; therefore, “[the banking and regulatory laws] in most
countries will eventually need some adjustment to accommodate licensed
microfinance.”36
Financial regulation includes prudential and non-prudential aspects.37 The
purpose of the prudential aspect is to control systemic risk in the financial system
and to protect depositors.38 Microfinance institutions that receive deposits from
the general public need prudential regulation.39 Prudential regulation mandates
capital adequacy requirements and rules for provisioning loan losses; it also
requires a supervisory process to ensure compliance.40 Granting a license to a
“regulated” institution portrays the government’s stamp of approval for the
soundness of the institution.41
There is a growing consensus that not all MFIs need to be regulated.42
Specifically, donor-funded, credit-only MFIs that do not receive deposits from the
general public do not need to be formally regulated.43 Regulatory resources should
be primarily reserved for larger institutions, and caution should be exercised when

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Prudential regulation refers to regulation that is designed specifically to protect the financial
system as a whole while also protecting small deposits in individual institutions. See ROBERT PECK
CHRISTEN ET AL., GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF MICROFINANCE (2003),
http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.9.2787/ [hereinafter Microfinance Consensus Guidelines].
When a deposit-receiving institution becomes insolvent, its failure could send a signal to the public,
leading to a run on deposits. Id. Prudential regulation refers to the government’s oversight of the
financial soundness of the regulated institutions. Id. The government aims to ensure that licensed
institutions remain financially viable or stop receiving deposits if they become insolvent. Id.; see also
CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 27.
38
See ROSENBERG ET AL,, supra note 31. Systemic risk refers to the risk that affects the entire
market or system, and not just specific participants. See also Aaron Jones, Promotion of a
Commercially-Viable Microfinance Sector in Emerging Markets, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
187, 200 (2006).
39

See Microfinance Consensus Guideline, supra note 37.

40

See ROSENBERG ET AL,, supra note 31; see also Jones, supra note 38, at 201.

41

See CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 27. Some requirements are non-prudential, not
because they are insignificant, but because they do not require the government’s financial authority to
vouch for, or assume responsibility for, the soundness of the institution. Id. at 9. Such regulation
includes consumer protection measures, external audits, and certain disclosure requirements. Id.
42
Id.; see also Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37; HENNIE VAN GREUNING ET AL.,
A
FRAMEWORK
FOR
REGULATING
MICROFINANCE
INSTITUTIONS
(Dec.
1998),
http://www.mfc.org.pl/doc/backgroundmaterials/A_Framework_for_Regulating.pdf.
43
See CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 27. These institutions are too small to cause systemic
risks and they do not create risks to depositors. The task of supervising many smaller institutions would
be burdensome on the regulatory authority, and could divert resources from the primary objective of
maintaining the safety and soundness of the banking system. See ALEX COUNTS & SHARMI SOBHAN,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CREATION OF A PRO-MICROCREDIT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ( 2001),
available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/35924_file_10.pdf.
With the growth of the microfinance sector, many countries are home to thousands of small
institutions offering microcredit. See Mix Home Page, http://www.themix.org/. Many of these
institutions have less than 1,000 borrowers; it would be an inefficient allocation of financial and
administrative resources for the regulatory body to supervise all of them.
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regulating smaller deposit-taking MFIs.44 “Regulation of [smaller] institutions
may be impracticable because proportionately more regulatory resources and costs
are required to regulate them, while their small size and community focus may
make private peer supervision by members and depositors more effective.”45
Regarding the issue of which regulations to apply to MFIs, a growing body
of research argues that regulations and supervisory tools should be adapted to the
unique characteristics of the microfinance sector.46 Some countries have
developed legal “windows” that are dedicated to microfinance and under which
MFIs are regulated and licensed.47 Adapting the existing framework to the needs
of microfinance may be more likely to attract existing financial institutions to
microfinance.48 However, local factors will determine the feasibility of such an
option. Lawmakers may be hesitant to expand the existing banking laws to reach
microfinance, as such a practice could lead to further, unrelated, reconsiderations
of banking issues.49
In determining whether certain characteristics of microfinance banks justify
special adaptation from existing regulatory laws, there are several factors to
consider. While a bank is a bank—whether it is small or large, basic or complex—
it may be beneficial to examine several distinguishing aspects of microfinance
banks. The client base of MFIs differs from that of commercial banks as MFI
borrowers are poor entrepreneurs typically working in the informal economy,
rather than working for registered, formal businesses.50
The lending
methodologies differ, as lending decisions in MFIs are based on character and are
rarely backed by conventional collateral, whereas conventional banking loans are
based on sophisticated analysis of financial statements and are backed by tangible
assets.51 The structure and governance of MFIs are unique. Taking loans to a
widely dispersed rural clientele typically results in a decentralized structure, rather
than the centralized and bureaucratic structure of most commercial banks.
Together with the lending methodology this accounts for high transactional costs

44

See Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37.

45

Jones, supra note 38; see also CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 27, at 10-11.

46

See Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37; see also CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG,
supra note 27; Jones, supra note 38.
47
Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37, at 9. Such windows can be helpful as the
microfinance sector begins maturation, but may not be necessary at further stages of development of the
sector. At an early stage, the desired regulatory impact can be accomplished by adapting general
banking laws to the specific needs of microfinance. CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 27. This
practice will allow regulators and legislators time to acquire more expertise with the microfinance
sector and to consider which regulations will balance the twin objectives of creating a welcoming legal
framework that allows MFIs to flourish and adequately addressing safety and soundness concerns. Id.
48

Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37, at 9. Commercial financial institutions may
be more likely to do business with MFIs that operate under the same banking laws. Additionally, it
may make mergers between MFIs and commercial banks more logistically feasible. See infra note
227-28.
49

Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37.

50

JAY K. ROSENGARD ET AL., MICROFINANCE DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: K-REP’S TRANSITION
FROM NGO TO DIVERSIFIED HOLDING COMPANY AND COMMERCIAL BANK 1 (June 2000).
51

Id.

2009

MICROFINANCE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

401

for most microfinance institutions.52 MFI portfolios are comprised of a high
volume of small, short-term loans rather than more efficient larger, long-term loans
that are typical of retail banking portfolios.53 Deposits in MFIs are primarily from
low-income community-based savers, rather than highly mobile short-term
investors.54 These characteristics distinguish MFIs from commercial banks and
support the notion that MFIs should be regulated differently.55
A. Challenges for microfinance regulation
While there is a general understanding that regulation of microfinance has
positive results for the sector,56 it is not without challenges. As microfinance
institutions are unique in structure, regulatory supervision poses issues that do not
arise in the commercial banking sector.57
Banking supervisors in many developing countries supervise a commercial
banking system with extreme structural problems, often including many struggling
large banks.58 The collapse of one of these banks (many countries face the
potential of numerous collapsing banks) could threaten the country’s financial
system with implosion.59 While managing bank risk, the supervisor may have to
handle political ramifications, as “the owners of banks are seldom
underrepresented in the political process.”60 If a bank supervisor shows resistance
to adding MFIs—mostly small institutions offering uncollateralized loans and
posting small profitability numbers—to his or her list of responsibilities, it is
important to acknowledge that his or her rationale may be better than outright
disregard for the poor.61
When a supervising body determines to oversee MFIs, it will face many
challenges. The most basic challenge arises from ownership structure.62 For

52

Id.; see infra note 179.

53

ROSENGARD ET AL., supra note 50, at 1.

54

Id.

55

See supra notes 46 & 47.

56

See HENNIE VAN GREUNING ET AL., supra note 42; see also, ROBIN YOUNG & LAUREN MITTEN,
LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR MICROFINANCE: A DESK STUDY ( Feb.
2000) Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37.
57

GREUNING ET AL., supra note 42

58

CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 27, at 3. This portion of the paper refers frequently to a
“banking supervisor.” Id. This term refers to the individual supervisor or the supervisory body that is
charged with regulating the country’s financial system. Id. Typically, this is the role of a country’s
central bank. Id.
59

Id. Implosion refers to a sudden inward collapse of the institution, the effects of which would be
felt by the entire financial system. This is a similar concept as systemic risk. See supra note 38.
60

Id.

61

Id. Supervisors in developing countries typically have their hands full with problems among the
commercial banks. See, e.g., Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37. Because of the
existing difficulties even without inclusion of risky MFIs, supervisors can appear reluctant to add MFIs
to their supervisory responsibilities. Id.
62

ROBERT PECK CHRISTEN & RICHARD ROSENBERG, THE RUSH TO REGULATE: LEGAL
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commercial banks, ownership generally includes wealthy individuals with their
own money at risk in the bank.63 Such owners desire a financial return from the
bank and have a personal interest in the bank’s success. They have an incentive to
monitor the bank’s manager to ensure that management is consistent with the longterm financial health of the bank.64 These owners play a role in the line of defense
for the safety of the bank;65 as such, they help the supervising body with its job of
maintaining stability in the financial system.
Most MFIs are under different ownership structures than commercial banks.
Nearly all MFIs have a governing board that provides independent management of
oversight.66 Where board members serve for altruistic reasons and do not have
large amounts of personal wealth at risk in the MFI, they tend not to monitor
management’s actions as scrupulously as business investors do.67 This ownership
situation is not a surface level dilemma that can be solved by a banking license and
regulation by the supervising body. It is a deeply rooted issue that can only be
solved when the ownership moves more into the hands of people who have
personal financial interests in the success of the institution.68
The difference between bank owners with personal money at risk and owners
without it becomes most apparent when the institution incurs financial
difficulties.69 A capital call is one of the supervising body’s most effective
regulating tools.70 Bank owners are likely to comply with such calls in order to
preserve the capital they have already committed to the bank.71 While capital calls
can be effective with commercial banks, they lose much of their influence when

FRAMEWORKS FOR MICROFINANCE 6 (Dec. 1999), http://www.gdrc.org/icm/govern/regulation.pdf.
63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id. These owners play a role in ensuring the safety of the bank as they are self-interested in the
bank’s financial success. Id. Naturally, they will motivate the managers to perform well. If the
managers do not meet expectations, the owners can make the decision to replace them. Id.
66

Id.

67

Id. Of course there are exceptions, but boards of NGOs are in large measure more relaxed about
their financial institution’s financial viability than their commercial banking counterparts. Id. This
should not be taken as any derogatory shot at such boards; it is not a question of quality of board
members, but is simply a reflection of the structure of their incentives. While such is currently
accurate, the trend is moving more towards hiring proven business minds to the boards of non-forprofits. See Elizabeth Littlefield &Richard Rosenberg, Microfinance and the Poor: Breaking Down the
Walls Between Microfinance and the Formal Financial System, 41-2 FIN. & DEV. 38 (June 2004),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2004/06/pdf/littlefi.pdf.
68

CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 6; see also supra note 61.

69

CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 8.

70

A regulating tool is a way in which a supervisor ensures the solvency of the institutions she
oversees. Id. A capital call is when the supervisor instructs bank owners to put more capital into the
bank or the institution will be shut down. Id. Such calls are issued to ensure the long-term viability of
the institution and to minimize systemic risk. See id.
71
Id. As indicated, commercial bank owners are typically wealthy individuals who can come up
with additional money on short notice. In fact, many countries make such readily accessible capital an
important condition to obtaining a license. CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 8.
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applied to MFIs.72
Another supervisor’s tool is to order a halt to new lending until a problem is
taken care of. While effective for commercial banks, this tool is not as applicable
to MFIs.73 A commercial bank can stop new loans without jeopardizing the ability
to collect on its existing loans; MFIs do not enjoy such liberty.74 MFI clients are
motivated to repay loans by their expectation of reliable and responsive future
services.75 If the MFI “denies prompt follow-up loans to clients who have
punctually repaid prior loans, the MFI is breaching an implicit contract with its
customers, many of whom will stop repaying their existing loans the minute the
word gets out.”76 Thus, an order for an MFI to stop its lending can wipe out the
institution’s loan portfolio if kept in place for very long.77
The cost of supervision is another challenge to regulating the microfinance
sector. Supervisory agency costs are relatively low in the case of commercial
banks, and can usually be passed on to the banks and their customers.78 Costs for
supervising MFIs are “likely to be much more expensive, given the MFIs’
generally smaller asset base, their much larger number of accounts, their high
degree of decentralization, and finally the more labor-intensive nature of
inspecting their portfolio.”79 In addition to the costs to the supervisor, the

72
Id. This point is illustrated by the experience of Finansol, an MFI in Colombia. Finansol had
suffered deep loan losses, reducing its cushion of owners’ capital. See Carlos Vasconcellos & Solange
Monteiro, How Not to Manage a Microfinance Institution: The Microfinance Industry’s Most Common
Errors Affect the Entire Chain of Small and Microenterprises MICROENTERPRISE AMERICAS, 2003,
available at http://www.iadb.org/sds/mic/micamericas/eng/3/pages30.33.pdf. The Colombian bank
supervisor issued a capital call. Id. The principal owner of Finansol was the NGO Corposol, which had
no additional funds to contribute to the rescue. Id. Finansol’s closure and the consequential loss of the
NGO’s investment would not affect the personal pocket books of the NGO’s board members. Id.
Naturally, the board members decided not to dig into those pocket books to infuse more money into the
failing finance company. See CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 8.
73
CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 5; see also Microfinance Consensus Guidelines,
supra note 37, at 26.
74

CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 5.

75

Microfinance borrowers are reliant on continual access to loans. Access to future loans is
contingent upon borrowers’ timeliness of repayments, so the borrowers are motivated to make
consistent payments. If borrowers learn that an MFI is ordered to temporarily halt lending, the
borrowers may lose motivation to make timely repayments on current loans. See id.
76

Id. at 8.

77

Id. This principle is illustrated by the example of Finansol, a licensed MFI in Colombia. See
Vasconcellos & Monteiro, supra note 72. The Colombian bank supervisor issued a lending halt to
Finansol because of escalating repayment problems. Id. Three months after issuing the lending halt,
the supervisor declared Finansol to be insolvent, as loan losses had wiped out over half of its equity
during the year. Id. The lending freeze had worsened Finansol’s repayment problem; when clients
learned that they would not get new loans, many stopped paying their old loans. Id.
78
79

CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 11.

Id. For example, a decentralized MFI with 10,000 clients could expect to incur supervision costs
of one to five percent of assets, which would likely be passed on to the MFI and its clients. Id. This
raises an important issue in determining whether it is beneficial to supervise MFIs, as it becomes a
fragile balance of costs and benefits of doing such. This does not imply that MFIs are unable to absorb
such costs; rather, the high spreads and loan interest rates allow a sufficient cushion for many MFIs. Id.
Additionally, some governments with a favorable outlook for microfinance may be willing to subsidize
these costs by allowing MFIs to pay the same percentage of assets as commercial banks. Id.
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supervised institution incurs substantial costs.80 Such costs can typically equal
about five percent of the portfolio in the MFI’s first year of operations.81 The
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor estimates that the cost of supervision can be
up to five percent of total costs during the first year of regulation and declines to
about one percent for the ensuing years.82 However, many of the initial costs
associated with regulation involve internal improvements required to meet
supervisory benchmarks.83 Most of these improvements benefit the institution in
the long-term, as they are necessary for operating a viable microfinance
institution.84
In addition to the financial burdens, there are non-monetary costs to
regulation. Regulation can hinder competition and can stifle innovation.85 The act
of writing a set of rules for microfinance entails the supervising body making
decisions as to which types of institutions are the best to do microfinance.86 This
may limit some institutions; boundaries are drawn and experimentation outside
those boundaries can be squelched.87
B. Benefits to microfinance regulation
ACCION International, a leading microfinance organization whose network
of partners has lent over $23 billion to over seven million people,88 conducted a
study on the costs and benefits of microfinance regulation.89 With the exception of

80

Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37, at 28.

81

Id. For example, BancoSol’s chief financial officer estimated costs of regulation to his institution
at five percent for the first year, with the percentage declining in later years. See CLAUDIO GONZALEZVEGA ET AL., BANCOSOL: THE CHALLENGE OF GROWTH FOR MICROFINANCE ORGANIZATIONS (Aug.
1996),http://www.microfinance.com/English/Papers/Bolivia_BancoSol_
Growth.pdf. Once the institution reaches scale, the costs of supervision are insignificant. Id.
BancoSol’s financial manager estimates that reporting to the supervisory body costs one percent of its
lending portfolio. See, CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 6.
82
See Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37, at 28; see also Elisabeth Rhyne, Senior
Vice President, Research, Dev. and Pol’y, ACCION Int’l, Presentation of The Experience of
Microfinance Institutions With Regulation and Supervision at the 5th International Forum on
Microenterprise
2
(Sept.
10,
2002)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/14184_Rhyne.doc).
83

See Rhyne, supra note 82.

84

Id.

85

Id. By placing too many restrictions on the institutions it regulates, a supervisory body can limit
the institution’s ability to experiment and innovate. See COUNTS & SOBHAN, supra note 43.
86
See CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 10; see also Microfinance Consensus Guidelines,
supra note 37.
87
CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 12. This is not merely a theoretical concern. For
many years, Latin American microfinance NGOs experimented with microcredit products and
methodologies that were inconsistent with the legal provisions of the regulated financial system. See id.
Without such experimentation, it is questionable that microfinance in the region would have blossomed
as it has. Id.
88
See ACCION, http://www.accion.org/NETCOMMUNITY/Page.aspx?pid=492&srcid=254 (last
visited Apr. 3, 2009).
89

The study consisted of detailed interviews with microfinance institutions from six countries in
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one, all of the institutions in the study had experienced transformation from NGO
status to a formally regulated institution, and thus were able to compare the
experiences of doing business in an unregulated versus a regulated environment.90
The results indicate that the institutions were overwhelmingly pleased to be
regulated, as all reported that the benefits of regulation outweighed the costs.91
The institutions indicated that the process of becoming regulated had led to many
benefits, namely: 1) “greater access to sources of funds for both equity and debt
financing, especially commercial sources”;92 2) greater ability to expand services
to serve more clients;93 3) improved operations by meeting stricter control and
reporting standards;94 4) more flexibility in offering products beyond microcredit,
especially savings and transfers;95 and 5) legitimacy in the commercial sector and
enhanced credibility with clients.96
The licensing process can be lengthy and several institutions noted that this
was the most difficult aspect of being regulated.97 Nonetheless, they indicated that
“most of the internal improvements they were required to make during this process
were beneficial, in areas such as internal control, reporting capabilities, branch
physical security, and the like.”98 Typically, the minimum capital requirements are
higher for formalized institutions than for NGOs.99 It is important to note that
meeting the higher capital requirements was not a major issue for the institutions in
the survey.100 Most of the institutions reported that “the minimum capital needed
was the same or less than the amount of capital needed to achieve and maintain
profitable operations, and therefore, it did not pose a binding constraint.”101
While the challenges to microfinance regulation may be substantial, the
institutions in ACCION’s study indicate that such impediments are outweighed by
the resulting benefits.102 Regulation of the microfinance sector allows MFIs to
reach more clients sustainably, as they are enabled to tap into commercial sources
Latin America. Leslie Theodore & Jacques Trigo Loubiere, The Experience of Microfinance
Institutions with Regulation and Supervision: Perspectives from Practitioners and a Supervisor
(Microenterprise Best Practices, Working Draft, Oct. 2001), available at http://www.microlinks.org/
ev02.php?ID=7499_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC (follow “File the experience of microfinance
institutions.pdf” hyperlink).
90
Rhyne, supra note 82, at 1; see infra Section III (providing a detailed discussion of transitioning
from an NGO to a formalized bank).
91

Rhyne, supra note 82, at 2; see also CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62.

92

Rhyne, supra note 82, at 2; see also Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 67.

93

Rhyne, supra note 82, at 2.

94

Id.

95

Id.; see also ROSENGARD ET AL., supra note 50, at 1.

96

Rhyne, supra note 82, at 3.

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

See STASCHEN, supra note 31.

100

Rhyne, supra note 82, at 3.

101

Id.

102

See CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 6.
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of funding.103 Additionally, regulated MFIs enjoy more flexibility in the range of
products (particularly savings) they can offer their clients. As such, MFIs gain
credibility among clients and the formal financial sector. For these reasons, this
comment supports the notion that the benefits to microfinance regulation outweigh
the challenges.
III. ASPECTS OF A SOUND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MICROFINANCE
It is understood that each country should adapt its legal framework to the
specific needs of the country. Nevertheless, there are several principles that
transcend borders; this section outlines four such principles. This comment
submits that legal and regulatory frameworks for microfinance should possess the
following four characteristics: microfinance services integrated with formal
financial sector; regulation based on a tiered approach; ease of transitioning from
an NGO to a formalized bank; and no cap on interest rates.
A. Microfinance services should be integrated with the formal financial
sector
Microfinance services in developing countries were initiated primarily by
socially-conscious NGOs and multi-lateral donors.104 The sector currently remains
dominated by such organizations.105 However, in recent years, the microfinance
sector has been moving towards more commercial models.106
Such
commercialization includes traditional MFIs or credit unions that have
commercialized and become licensed financial institutions to broaden their reach,
commercial banks expanding their services to the poor, and new MFIs established
with the objective of operating financially sustainably.107 Littlefield and
Rosenberg describe this recent trend:
[F]inancial systems that serve poor clients [are] beginning to engage all kinds of
financial institutions providing a wide range of financial service. Financial
regulators, mainstream rating agencies, commercial and state banks, insurance
companies, and credit bureaus are all starting to play a part in developing sound,
inclusive financial systems that serve the majority of poor countries’ citizens. The

103
As MFIs move towards financial markets, they can tap into additional funding. This funding
will allow MFIs to expand their outreach to more clients. See Rhyne, supra note 82.
104

PATRICK MEAGHER, MICROFINANCE REGULATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A
COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF CURRENT PRACTICE (IRIS 2002), http://microfinancegateway.org/files/
14077_14077.pdf.
105

See CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62.

106

ROBERT PECK CHRISTEN, COMMERCIALIZATION AND MISSION DRIFT: THE TRANSFORMATION
MICROFINANCE IN LATIN AMERICA (Jan. 2001), http://www.cgap.org/gm/document1.9.2700/OccasionalPaper_05.pdf; see Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 38-40. Commercial
models refer generally to the provision of financial services to the poor by institutions that rely in part
or whole on private sources of financing, managed so as to be financially sustainable by lending on
economically viable terms. See THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF MICROFINANCE: BALANCING BUSINESS
AND DEVELOPMENT 3 (Deborah Drake & Elisabeth Rhyne eds., 2002).
OF

107

See CHRISTEN, supra note 106, at 4.
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boundaries between microfinance and the formal financial sector are breaking
down.108

Advocates for the commercialization of microfinance point to the limitations
of operating on donor funds.109 In order to narrow the gulf between microfinance
demand and supply, proponents argue that MFIs will need to become economically
viable and tap into commercial sources of funding, particularly deposits.110 If
outreach is a primary objective for microfinance, proponents see
commercialization as the only viable way for rapid expansion.111 While NGOs
and other smaller, unlicensed MFIs may continue to have an impact on the sector,
it is generally accepted that the only way to expand services to a scale that is
sufficient to meet the unmet demand is through commercialization.112 There is an
emerging consensus that the growth of sustainable institutions and mobilization of
local savings are the most likely ways to meet this unmet demand.113
Critics raise the issue that market principles should not be introduced into
microfinance practices, as it could lead to “mission drift,” whereby practitioners
focus more on profits than the social benefits that microfinance originally set out to
obtain.114 Such critics point out that financially sustainable MFIs typically have
larger loan sizes than smaller NGOs, suggesting they do not serve the smaller
clients.115 The argument is, therefore, that it is not possible to attain financial
sustainability while maintaining fidelity to the poorer clients.116
As to the critics’ argument, the available literature suggests that the dual
objectives of financial sustainability and impact on poverty are not
incompatible.117 Studies have shown that financially sustainable MFIs have a
greater impact on clients’ incomes than those that are not sustainable, though the

108

Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 38-40.

109

Id.; see supra note 22; see also CGAP, MAXIMIZING THE OUTREACH OF MICROENTERPRISE
FINANCE: THE EMERGING LESSONS OF SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS (Oct. 1995), http://www.cgap.org/gm/
document-1.9.2548/FocusNote_02.pdf; Jones, supra note 38.
110
See CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62; see also Robert C. Vogel et al., Microfinance
Regulation and Supervision Concept Paper 1 (USAID 2000).
111
See Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 38-40; see DALEY-HARRIS, supra note 21; see
also CHRISTEN, supra note 106, at 4; Jones, supra note 38.
112
See Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 67; see DALEY-HARRIS, supra note 21; see also CGAP,
MAXIMIZING THE OUTREACH OF MICROENTERPRISE FINANCE: THE EMERGING LESSONS OF
SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS (Oct. 1995), http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2548/FocusNote_02.pdf;
Jones, supra note 38.
113
There is a large body of literature arguing this point. See Robinson, supra note 3; see also
Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 67; Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37; CHRISTEN,
supra note 106, at 4.

38.

114

See DRAKE & RHYNE, COMMERCIALIZATION OF MICROFINANCE, 2 (2002).

115

See CHRISTEN, supra note 106, at 4; see also DRAKE & RHYNE, supra note 105, at 4.

116

See CHRISTEN, supra note 106, at 4

117

See Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 67; see also CGAP, supra note 109; Jones, supra note
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sustainable MFIs may target clients who are not as poor.118 Additionally, when
poorer clients with small loans are shown to be an economically viable sector,
sustainable banks typically seek to enter the sector.119 This evidence seems to
suggest that the goals of financial sustainability and poverty reduction are
compatible. Therefore, introducing market principles in the microfinance sector
does not necessarily lead to mission drift.
As financially sustainable MFIs exemplify the feasibility of profitably
offering financial services to the poor, integration between microfinance and the
formal financial sector is expanding. Most of the leading microfinance
organizations implement similar techniques and disciplines of commercial
finance.120 Such organizations “are investing in more sophisticated management
and information systems, applying International Accounting Standards, contracting
annual audits from mainstream auditing firms, and seeking ratings from
commercial rating agencies.”121 Recognizing the successful trend towards
commercialization, “more and more MFIs are getting licensed as banks or
specialized finance companies, allowing them to fund themselves from capital
markets, and from deposits that are not only a source of capital but also an
important service to their clients.”122
A successful legal framework will encourage microfinance involvement with
mainstream financial markets. Such involvement may come in the form of the
government creating new types of financial licenses that allow for lower minimum
capital.123 Another possibility is creating partnerships between microfinance
institutions and commercial banks; such partnerships enable MFIs to reduce
expenses while extending outreach and allow banks to diversify assets while
increasing revenue and tapping new markets.124
Such initiatives allow
microfinance to thrive, because “[t]o achieve its full potential, microfinance must
become a fully integrated part of a developing country’s mainstream financial
system.”125

118
See CGAP, FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY, TARGETING THE POOREST, AND INCOME IMPACT: ARE
THERE TRADEOFFS FOR MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS? (Dec. 1996), http://www.cgap.org/gm/
document-1.9.2551/FocusNote_05.pdf.
119

ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 14-17.

120

Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 5.

121

Id. In 2004, rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Duffs and Phelps carried
out credit ratings of over 100 MFIs. Id. These credit rating agencies are companies that assign credit
ratings to organizations that issue different types of debt obligations. These rating agencies measure
such things as credit worthiness and loan repayment records. Id.
122
Id. The fact that MFIs are entering capital markets is evidenced by several Latin American
MFIs’ bond issuances. For example, Compartamos, an MFI in Mexico, raised $15 million from issuing
a straight bond in 2002. Id.
123

Id. at 6.

124

Id.

125

Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 67, at.6.
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B. Regulation should be based on a tiered approach
The legal and regulatory framework should be flexible enough to deal with
different institutions differently. One way to ensure this flexibility is to
incorporate a process of tiered regulation and supervision, within which the type
and degree of supervision and regulation depends upon the degree of risk
associated with the institution’s activities.126 In a tiered banking structure, “a
range of financial intermediaries is licensed by the regulatory banking authority to
provide banking and financial services to the public.”127 The licenses granted
indicate limits to the services that may be offered, as well as the necessary
prudential guidelines.128 Small, community-focused banks can function alongside
large universal banks in a “tiered banking” structure which remains under the
jurisdiction of the regulatory bank authority.129 The MFI’s source of funds is the
primary factor in determining in which “tier” the institution should be
categorized.130 MFIs can be classified into three categories: (1) MFIs which
depend on donors or money from others, (2) MFIs that depend on money from
their members, and (3) MFIs that leverage money from the public.131 The table
below illustrates the tiers.132 The table identifies thresholds of financial
intermediation activities which indicate a requirement for an MFI to meet external
or mandatory regulatory guidelines.

126
127

GREUNING ET. AL., supra note 42, at i.
Id. at 14.

128
Id. For example, a license will indicate whether an MFI can collect deposits from the general
public or if it will be limited to taking deposits only from its members. See MEAGHER, supra note 104,
at 5; supra note 37 (discussing prudential regulation).
129

GREUNING ET. AL., supra note 42, at 14.; see also MEAGHER, supra note 104, at 5.

130

The source of funds refers to the source from which the MFI receives its funds, i.e. deposits,
commercial debt or equity. See JOANNA LEDGERWOOD, MICROFINANCE HANDBOOK: AN
INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 149 (World Bank 1999). Ledgerwood provides a broad
introduction to the financial aspects of microfinance. She provides a wealth of information on the
similarities and differences among microfinance and commercial banking. Id.
131
See GREUNING ET AL., supra note 42, at i. MFIs leverage money from the public by offering
savings accounts. The MFI uses the money collected in the savings accounts as lending capital to other
clients. This practice is advantageous to the MFIs as they can charge a higher interest rate to the
borrower than they pay out to the depositor.
132

Id. at ii.
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MFI Type
Activity that
Proposed Form of
Determines
External Regulation,
Regulatory
if Required
Status
Category A

Vol. II:2

Regulatory
Agency

MFIs
Type 1:
Non-profit
NGO

Type 2:
Non-profit
NGO with
limited deposittaking

Type 3:
NGO
transformed
into
incorporated
MFI

Category B
MFIs
Type 4
Credit Union,
Savings &
Credit
Cooperative
Society

Making
microfinance
loans not in
excess of grants
donated
Taking minor
deposits—forced
savings or
mandatory
deposit schemes,
from
microfinance
clients
Issuing
instruments to
generate funds
through
wholesale deposit
substitutes
(commercial
paper, largevalue certificates
of deposit,
investment
placement notes)

None—voluntary
registration, with selfregulatory
organization

None, or selfregulatory
organization

None—exemption or
exclusion provision of
banking law;
mandatory
registration with selfregulatory
organization

Self-regulatory
organization

Registration as
corporate legal entity;
authorization from
Bank Supervisory
Authority or
Securities &
Exchange Agency,
with limitations on
size, term and
tradability of
commercial paper
instruments

Companies’
Registry
Agency; Bank
Supervisory
Authority or
Securities &
Exchange
Agency

Operating as
closed or open
common bond
credit union;
deposit-taking
from memberclients

Notification to and
registration with
Cooperatives
Authority or Bank
Supervisory
Authority; or
certification and

Cooperatives
Authority, or
Bank
Supervisory or
Credit Rating
Entity

133
ROBIN YOUNG & LAUREN MITTEN, LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR
MICROFINANCE: A DESK STUDY (2000), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnacj223.pdf.
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rating by a private
independent credit
rating agency
Category C
MFIs
Type 5
Specialized
bank, deposittaking
institution, or
finance
company

Type 6
Licensed
mutual
ownership bank
Type 7
Licensed equity
bank

Taking limited
deposits (savings
and fixed
deposits) from
general public
beyond minor
deposits
exemption in
banking law.
Microfinance
activities more
extensive than
NGOs, but
operations not on
scale of licensed
banks
Non-restricted
deposit-taking
activities,
including
generating funds
through
commercial
paper and largevalue deposit
substitutes, from
the general
public

Registration and
licensing by Bank
Supervisory
Authority, with a
limitation provision
(e.g., savings and
fixed deposits,
smaller deposits-tocapital multiple,
higher liquidity
reserves, limits on
asset activities and
uses)

Bank
Supervisory
Authority

Registration and full
licensing by Bank
Supervisory
Authority as a mutual
ownership or equity
bank; compliance
with
capitalization/capital
adequacy
requirements, loan
loss provisioning and
full prudential
regulations

Bank
Supervisory
Authority

As the table indicates, there are three categories of microfinance institutions,
distinguished by how the institution receives its primary source of funding.
Category A MFIs use other people’s money (i.e., donors); category B MFIs use
members’ money; and category C MFIs use the general public’s money.134 The
categories (except for category B) consist of a variety of institutional types that
engage in very different activities. For example, category A includes three types
of NGOs: 1) type one is a basic non-profit NGO that engages uniquely offering
credit; 2) type two is a non-profit NGO that makes loans and receives minor
deposits from clients in the community through forced savings or mandatory
134

See supra note 131.
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deposit schemes; 3) type three, unlike the previous two, is an NGO that has
evolved into an incorporated MFI, and subsequently mobilizes funds through the
issuance of commercial paper and/or deposits. This type poses the highest
probability of causing systemic risk, and therefore requires the most stringent
regulation within category A.
The activities, and the risks associated with these activities (including the
risks associated with how the institution obtains its funds), determine the
regulatory status of an institution.135 No external regulation is necessary for types
1 and 2 MFIs. Donors, government agencies and commercial banks fund these
MFIs, and are presumed to have the capability for institutional due diligence.136
The institutions that receive savings from the general public pose the highest level
of risk (to themselves and the financial system) and are therefore subject to the
most stringent forms of regulation.137
There is much variety among microfinance institutions.138 An effective legal
framework for microfinance will not treat each institution the same, but will adapt
its regulation to the varying levels of sophistication of the institution.139
C. The framework should facilitate an easy transition from NGO to
formalized bank
The percentage of NGO MFIs likely to scale to wide outreach and financial
viability is small.140 In order to achieve such objectives, MFIs need to collect
deposits.141 Deposits can only be raised from the general public when MFIs
undergo institutional transformation into licensed formal banking institutions
subject to prudential regulation.142
While the microfinance industry has
experienced operational growth, “the range of institutional channels is segmented
by the current legal and regulatory environment in most countries.”143 A sound
legal framework would benefit microfinance by transforming the fragmented
spectrum into a cohesive continuum, which would enable MFIs to pursue a process

135

YOUNG, supra note 133, at 10.

136

GREUNING ET. AL., supra note 42, at 12.

137

Id.

138

See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 133. Some institutions receive funding from donors; others collect
deposits from the public. Some MFIs only offer credit, while others offer a wide range of products to
clients. See LEDGERWOOD, supra note 130.
139
For example, small non-profit NGOs that do not receive deposits do not require supervision
from a regulatory body. See, e.g. YOUNG, supra note 133; see also supra note 37 (discussing nonprudential regulation and systemic risk). Larger, specialized banks with unlimited deposit-taking
activities would require regulation from the bank supervisory authority. See, YOUNG, supra note 133.
140

GREUNING ET AL., supra note 42, at 9.

141

Collecting deposits will provide a consistent source of funds for MFIs, which will allow them to
expand their outreach more rapidly. See supra note 24-25.
142
143

GREUNING ET AL., supra note 42, at 9.
Id.
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of progressive institutional transformation.144
The framework for banking laws “should be structured to provide MFIs with
a clear view of the thresholds to attain on the path to institutional development and
transformation.”145 There are several examples of NGOs that have successfully
made the transformation into formalized banks.146 The following examples of KRep Bank in Kenya and BancoSol in Bolivia are two such examples.
1. Example of K-Rep Bank
The Kenya Rural Enterprise Programme (K-Rep) was established in 1984 by
World Education Inc., a private voluntary group based in the United States.147 It is
now one of the most successful microfinance organizations in Africa, with over
110,000 active borrowers and a gross loan portfolio of over $50 million.148 After
K-Rep had established itself as a sound provider of microloans, management
decided to transform its microenterprise credit program into a commercial bank.149
K-Rep cites several objectives for this decision:
1) Achieve institutional and financial sustainability through improved governance
and increased profitability; 2) Balance management time between profitable
microfinance activities and complementary services that usually require some
degree of subsidization; 3) Gain access to additional sources of capital, particularly
from client savings, thereby reducing K-Rep’s dependence on donor funds,
expanding K-Rep’s market outreach, and recycling client savings to
microenterprises rather than channeling them through traditional banks to finance
wealthier sectors of the economy; and 4) Offer additional financial services to
microentrepreneurs and other low-income populations.150

In March 1999, the Central Bank of Kenya granted K-Rep a commercial
banking license, marking a key point in financial sector development in Kenya, as
it was the first banking license ever issued to a microfinance institution.151

144

Id. This approach is outlined in the concept of tiered regulation, supra note 131.

145

JOSELITO GALLARDO, FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 13 (2002).

146

See LEDGERWOOD, supra note 130.

147

ROSENGARD ET. AL, supra note 50, at 1.

148

See a financial overview of K-Rep on the website for the Mix Market, a clearing house of
microfinance information. Mix Market, Profile of K-Rep, http://www.mixmarket.org/en/demand/
demand.show.profile.asp?token=&ett=956 (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
149

ROSENGARD ET AL., supra note 50, at 1.

150

Id.

151

Id. at 22. Granting the banking license signified the Kenyan government’s efforts to promote
the microfinance sector. In the 2000 budget speech, the Kenyan Minister of Finance expressed public
sector support for microfinance as he announced plans for the Central Bank of Kenya to establish a
division within its banking department to assist the microfinance sector. Id. He further encouraged
integration between microfinance institutions and the commercial banking sector. Id.
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2. Example of BancoSol
BancoSol is one of the leading microfinance organizations in Latin America,
with over 100,000 active borrowers and a total loan portfolio of over $160
million.152 BancoSol is a commercial bank that is dedicated to serving the poor
entrepreneurs of Bolivia, and is respected as the first private commercial bank to
specialize in microfinance.153 Just as any bank in Bolivia, BancoSol operates
under the regulatory framework of the Central Bank and is subject to prudential
regulation.154 BancoSol distinguishes itself from the other Bolivian banks as it has
developed its strong portfolio on well-performing microloans.155 Although
licensed as a formal bank, BancoSol has altruistic roots. Its majority shareholders
are NGOs and donor organizations, and the remaining shareholders are influential
Bolivian businessmen.156
Founded as an NGO by the name of PRODEM, the institution transitioned to
a formalized commercial bank in 1992.157 While the NGO was successful in
reaching poor clients, the management recognized that their NGO status placed
limitations on expansion by preventing access to commercial funds.158 Funds from
the market would enable the organization to respond to clear demands for credit
from the rural poor and to manage its cash flows better amidst seasonal variations
of such demand.159 Additionally, the NGO was limited in the financial services it
could provide its clients. Specifically, it could not offer savings services and
therefore could not generate capital through leveraging savings.160 Thus,
BancoSol was created in order to better serve the rural poor through channeling
sources from the commercial markets.
Formalization as a licensed bank resulted in several advantages for
BancoSol. Chief among the advantages of upgrading to a commercial bank
included: 1) the ability to mobilize funds from the market with increased

152
See Mix Market, Profile for Bancosol, http://www.mixmarket.org/en/demand/demand.
show.profile.asp?token=&ett=280 (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
153

A. Glosser, The Creation of BancoSol in Bolivia, in THE NEW WORLD OF MICROENTERPRISE
FINANCE 307 (Mario Otero & Elisabeth Rhyne, eds. 1994).
154
CLAUDIO GONZALEZ-VEGA ET AL., BANCOSOL: THE CHALLENGE OF GROWTH FOR
MICROFINANCE ORGANIZATIONS, 6 (1996), www.microfinance.com/English/Papers/Bolivia_
BancoSol_Growth.pdf; see supra note 37 (providing a discussion of prudential regulation).
155

Id.

156

Id. International shareholders include public organizations and several NGOs: Societe
d’Investissement de Development International, Inter-American Investment Corporation, the
Rockefeller Foundation, the Calmeadow Foundation, and ACCION International. Id.
157

See Miriam J. Koreen, Banco Solidario: A New Model For Microfinance (Apr. 1999), available
at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/2137_bancosol_pub.doc.
158
Id. at 2. PRODEM could not meet the growing demand for microcredit in Bolivia because the
NGO’s source of funds was limited to donations, subsidized loans, and the interest it received from its
lending portfolio. Because of its NGO status, it could not access commercial sources of financing. Id.;
see also GONZALEZ-VEGA ET AL, supra note 154.
159

GONZALEZ-VEGA ET AL., supra note 154, at 4; see also Glosser, supra note 153.

160

GONZALEZ-VEGA ET AL., supra note 154, at 4.
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flexibility, through deposits from the public, bonds placed on domestic and
international capital markets, inter-bank loans, or access to Central Bank
rediscounts and other lines of credit;161 2) the benefits from expanded outreach,
realizing economies of scale;162 3) the protection offered from more intense,
rigorous and professional monitoring of its financial performance by the regulatory
supervisor (Superintendency of Banks), new lenders (other banks and bond
holders), and shareholders;163 and 4) the value of a bank charter in a financial
market with strict limitations on entry.164
As BancoSol switched from donor funding to market-based liabilities, the
average cost of funds increased from four percent at the time of conversion to a
commercial bank in 1992 to twelve percent in 1996.165 While BancoSol
experienced an increase in the cost of funds, transformation into a formal financial
entity resulted in increased funding from the market.166 Due to its bank charter
license, BancoSol increased the ratio of its liabilities to equity from 1.0 at the end
of 1992 to 6.2 at the end of 1994.167 With a healthy rate of return on assets, “the
rate of return on equity increased sharply, from 4.1 in 1992 to 13.8 in 1994,
reflecting this higher leverage.”168
There are certain policies to which a regulatory authority for microfinance
should adhere while facilitating an easy transition from NGO to formalized bank.
The amount of absolute capital to be held at all times is viewed as a very important
regulatory measure.169 Microfinance banks should be subject to the same
minimum capital adequacy requirements as formalized banks.170
As for

161

Id. at 5; see also supra notes 90 & 92.

162

GONZALEZ-VEGA ET AL., supra note 154, at 2. Economies of scale is an economics term that
refers to a production process in which the increase in outreach of an organization results in a decrease
in the average cost of each unit. Here, BancoSol is becoming more efficient as it reaches economies of
scale.
163

Id. at 4.

164

Id.

165

Id. at 13. This drastic increase in cost of funds is due to changing from reliance on donors and
soft loans. At the end of 1991, about 15% of PRODEM’s liabilities were deposits; 19% were loans from
private organizations, and the remaining 68% were soft loans from public entities. Id. These numbers
changed dramatically after the transition to BancoSol: by the end of 1994, loans from public entities
represented just 2% of total liabilities and deposits represented the majority. Id.
166
Id. As a commercial entity, BancoSol was able to raise funds through commercial markets,
whereas it was limited primarily to donor funds while it operated under NGO status. While its costs of
funds increased, its total number of available funds also increased, easing the strain of the increased
costs. Id.
167

Id.

168

Id.

169

STASCHEN, supra note 31, at 10. In this detailed study, the author found that each country with
microfinance regulation set an absolute amount of capital as one of the criteria for entry. Id. While
such a requirement allows for a general standard, the author notes a potential downside: the real value
of capital depletes over time, especially in the wake of inflation. Id.
170
Id. at 5. There is no dearth of commentary that argues that microfinance banks should be able to
maintain lower capital amounts, allowing them to transition from their NGO status more easily. See,
e.g. COUNTS & SOBHAN, supra note 43. While this argument has legitimacy, it does not account for
the relatively larger and faster impact that losses have on a microfinance bank’s capital base, as
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management quality, the regulatory body should not require unnecessarily complex
organizational structures or top-heavy staffing regimes for microfinance banks.171
The regulatory authority should not impose unduly high liquidity requirements on
microfinance banks.172 High reserve requirements would increase the cost of
doing business for a microfinance bank by lowering the number of available
lending capital from the institution’s deposit base.173 Several countries with a
thriving microfinance industry place limitations on MFI product characterizations.
The most common limitations are restrictions on the type of deposit facilities to be
offered.174 Countries also place restrictions on lending amounts, mandating
maximum loan sizes expressed as a percentage of capital or as a set amount.175
Such limitations are encouraged, so long as they are reasonable and do not hinder
innovation. The limitations protect the financial longevity of the institution and
maintain stability in the broader financial system.
D. There should be no interest rate cap
The administrative costs of managing a portfolio of many small loans are
much higher than managing a portfolio of several large loans.176 For this reason,
MFIs typically cannot operate sustainably unless they charge interest rates that are

compared to commercial banks. See STASCHEN, supra note 31, at 5. This argument also seems to
neglect the fact that many microfinance banks lack geographic or loan size diversification, and are thus
more vulnerable to institution-wide shocks. Id. In fact, for these reasons, some commentators suggest
that the capital adequacy ratio should be a little higher for microfinance banks than for commercial
banks. See generally ROSENGARD, supra note 50. Certain countries, such as Pakistan and Indonesia,
have different capitalization requirements for different regions of the country. See STASCHEN, supra
note 31, at 11. This rationale implies that certain regions may have higher average loan sizes or may be
more vulnerable to systemic economic shocks.
171
ROSENGARD, supra note 50, at 5. A key to the success of a microfinance institution is its
simplicity in organization and operations in order to ensure the financial stability of the bank. While
the management requirements should not be too complex, it would be prudent to insist on an
organizational structure that separates key functions for internal controls such as bookkeeping and
cashiering. It is similar rationale for reporting requirements. “Standard statistical reports are usually
designed for banks with a wide variety of extremely diverse and sophisticated services, while most
microfinance banks offer a limited range of simple products.” Id. at 26. Therefore, many commercial
banking reporting requirements are inapplicable to microfinance banks, and should be adapted to the
specific needs of microfinance. Specifically, documentation requirements should be simplified, in order
to accommodate the high volume of small loans. Id. at 5.
172

Id.

173

Id.; see also COUNTS & SOBHAN, supra note 43 (arguing that the minimum liquidity requirement
for microfinance institutions should not exceed 25% of the total available funds).
174

STASCHEN, supra note 31, at 18. For example, in Ghana, non-bank financial institutions, other
than credit unions and savings institutions, can only take term deposits. Id. It is common for countries
to limit deposit-taking by cooperatives from members of the cooperative. Id. In Nepal, cooperatives
are subject to a restricted duration for savings and time deposits of three years; cooperatives in Uganda
are not restricted to any duration limits on such deposits. Id.
175
Id. For example, in Ethiopia, MFIs are only permitted to lend up to a fixed amount of $600 to a
single borrower. Id. In Indonesia, regulatory authorities are leery of one borrower causing systemic
problems as MFIs are limited to lending 20% of their total capital to a single borrower. Id.
176

Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37, at 11.
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substantially higher than the rates banks charge their traditional borrowers.177 It is
simply a matter of costs. Relative to the amount of money lent, small loans cost
more to manage than big ones.178 Even for the most efficiently managed MFIs, it
is difficult to reduce administrative costs below about ten to twenty-five percent
(depending on loan size, methodology, and local market forces) of their
portfolio.179 By contrast, comparable costs in an efficient developing country
commercial bank are typically below five percent.180 A financially sustainable
MFI, therefore, must “charge an interest rate that could sound obscene in the
normal commercial-bank market or in the arena of political discussion.”181 The
poor borrowers of microcredit loans have shown for many years that they are
happy for access to loans, even at higher rates.182
Microcredit loan cycles are usually shorter than traditional commercial
loans.183 A typical loan term is six months to a year with payments plus interest
due weekly.184 Shorter loan cycles and weekly payments help the borrowers stay
current and avoid overwhelmingly large payments. The transaction-intense nature
of weekly payment collections, often in rural areas, is more expensive than running
a bank that provides large loans to financially stable borrowers in a metropolitan
area.185 Consequently, MFIs must charge interest rates that might sound high—the
average global rate is about thirty-five percent annually—to cover their costs.186
For a financial institution to scale and remain sustainable, at a bare minimum
it has to cover its costs. In the example below, a large bank can charge anything
over fourteen percent to recoup its costs, whereas the MFI has to charge a rate of at
least thirty-one percent to cover its costs.187

177

Id.

178

CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 7; see also Microfinance Consensus Guidelines,
supra note 37, at 13.
[A]dministrative costs do not vary in proportion to the amount lent. One may be
able to make a $20,000 loan while spending only $600 (3 percent) in
administrative costs; but this does not mean that administrative costs for a $200
loan will be only $6. In comparison with the amount lent, administrative costs
are inevitably much higher for microcredit than for conventional bank loans.
Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37, at 10.
179

CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 7.

180

Id. This is a conservative number; many commercial banks have administrative costs that are
well below 5 percent. Id.
181

Id.

182

Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37, at 11; see also CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG,
supra note 62.
183

See LEDGERWOOD, supra note 130.

184

See Unitus, supra note 9.

185

See LEDGERWOOD, supra note 130.

186

Id.

187

This table demonstrates the differences in costs of administering a loan for a large bank and a
microfinance institution. The numbers are based on a loan amount of $1,000,000, and the number of
loans is based off of estimates of an average loan size per client. Unitus, supra note 9.
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Cost of Administering a Loan188
Large Banks
Cost of Capital
Loan loss provision
Total Cost of Capital
Total amount of loan disbursed
Loan size
Number of loans
Yearly transactions
Cost of administering loan
Total cost to institution

10%
1%
11%
$1,000,000
$1,000,000
1
4-12
3%
14%

Microfinance
Institutions
10%
1%
11%
$1,000,000
$100
10,000
120,000-520,000
20%
31%

Public officials and the general public seldom grasp this dynamic and they
are therefore suspicious of microcredit interest rates, even in cases where the rates
do not reflect excessive profits or inefficiency.189 Policy makers in several
developing countries have limited interest rates.190 For example, in Bolivia, the
limit on the interest rate charged on loans is three percent per month.191 The
objective is to protect the poor from aggressive lenders, but such intentions often
backfire. When MFIs are required to charge a pre-determined interest rate, which
is usually much below the cost that the MFI incurs, MFIs are often forced to go out
of business.192 As a result, those whom the MFI would have served are left
without access to any financial services at all. This type of regulation often is a
disservice to the very people it is meant to protect.193 If government officials
control microcredit interest rates, “practical politics will usually make it difficult to
set an interest rate cap high enough to permit the development of sustainable
microcredit.”194 Interest rate caps usually hurt the poor—by limiting services—
more than they help the poor by the lower rates.195
While usury limits are counter-productive, policy makers may resort to
alternative means of protecting poor borrowers.196 In regions where deception is

188
Id. There are many aspects that determine an institution’s interest rate.
See RICHARD
ROSENBERG, MICROCREDIT INTEREST RATES (Nov. 2002), http://www.microfinancegateway.org/
content/article/detail/1827 (providing additional discussion of interest rate calculations). The numbers
in this table are simply examples to show the difference in costs to an MFI and to a commercial bank.
189

Sometimes high interest rates are reflective of high administrative costs and inefficient
management. See Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37, at 13.
190

FLEISIG & DE LA PEÑA, supra note 4, at 27.

191

Id.

192

See LEDGERWOOD, supra note 130.

193

See COUNTS & SOBHAN, supra note 43; see also Unitus, supra note 9.,

194

Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37, at 13.

195

Id.

196

FLEISIG & DE LA PEÑA, supra note 4, at 27.
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common, regulations may be imposed that require lenders to provide clear
statements of true annual interest rates to their clients.197 Suggestions include
providing numerical examples of what the interest rates mean, and protecting
illiterate clients by requiring a videotape presentation in the client’s native
language of the implications of such interest rates.198
In sum, there should be no cap on interest rates. Because of the necessarily
high administrative costs, microcredit programs may—at least initially—need to
charge interest rates that are higher than the rates in commercial banking
transactions. Such interest rate caps could stifle microfinance expansion, and
would therefore prevent poor households from access to credit.
IV. THE MICROCREDIT REGULATORY ACT OF 2006
The first three sections of this comment have provided a guideline for the
regulation of microfinance. The final section provides an example of an effective
microfinance law.199 While several countries have designed laws specifically for
microfinance regulation,200 Bangladesh stands apart as one of the first to establish
an independent regulatory institution with the sole purpose of supervising the
microfinance sector.201 The Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006 is an effective
legislative model that other countries should emulate.
Microfinance is a familiar concept in Bangladesh. Since Dr. Yunus began
lending money in 1976, the movement has gained tremendous momentum.202 The
twenty largest MFIs in Bangladesh reach twenty-one million clients affecting 105
million family members in a country of 140 million.203 Nearly ninety percent of
the microloan clients are female and the average loan amount is $60.204 The

197

Id.

198

Id.

199

The government of Bangladesh passed the law in 2006. See infra note 210. Bangladesh is
commonly referred to as the “birthplace of microfinance.” See Nick Louth, How to Help the Third
World With eBay, UK MSN MONEY, Nov. 15, 2007, available at http://money.uk.msn.com/investing/
articles/nicklouth/article.aspx?cp-documentid=6699608. As such, it appears fitting to analyze the
country’s progress towards a legal framework for microfinance.
200

See supra note 32.

201

In this regard, Bangladesh is a rather pioneering example. Some commentators argue that the
establishment of an independent regulatory body is essential to an effective legal framework for
microfinance. See, e.g., COUNTS AND SORBAM, supra note 43; see also Microfinance Consensus
Guidelines, supra note 37. As discussed, microfinance regulation is a daunting task. See supra note 60.
When an institution is established for the sole purpose of microfinance regulation, it is able to focus its
efforts.
202

While not a panacea, microfinance has positively impacted the rural poor of Bangladesh. In a
study for the World Bank, Shahidur Khandker’s research of three Bangladeshi MFIs found that
microcredit accounted for 40% of the entire reduction of moderate poverty in rural Bangladesh. See
Sam Daley-Harris et al., Debate on Microcredit, FPIF, June 21, 2007, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4324.
Additionally, Khandker’s study found that microcredit’s spillover effects among non-participants
reduced poverty among this group by some 1% annually for moderate poverty and 1.3% annually for
extreme poverty. Id.
203

Id.

204

See Microfinance Institutions (MFIs), http://www.bangladesh-bank.org/fnansys/mfi.html. It is a
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payback rate in the microfinance industry in Bangladesh is astounding, averaging
over ninety percent.205
As MFIs typically provide financial services to the poor outside the formal
banking system, the issue of a regulatory framework has come to the forefront of
political discussions.206 The unique features of MFIs in the field of social and
financial services with the core objectives of poverty alleviation differentiate the
industry from the formal financial sector. However, that does not in any way
downplay the importance of having some strategic monitoring measures that are
compatible and appropriate to MFIs’ objectives, institutional operation and
development culture.207
The phenomenal growth of the microfinance sector in terms of outreach and
product development encouraged the government to form a consortium of scholars
and practitioners to formulate guidelines for a microfinance regulatory
framework.208 The Microfinance Research and Reference Unit (the Unit) was
established in 2000, under the supervision of a National Steering Committee
headed by the Governor of the Bangladesh Bank.209 After much consultation with
experts in the sector, the Committee submitted a draft of a regulatory framework to
the government. The government passed a law, the Microcredit Regulatory Act of
2006 (the Act), in July 2006.210 Under this law the government established a
separate Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA) and constituted its board of
directors, with the governor of the Bangladesh Bank as the chairperson.211
The law grants broad powers to the Microcredit Regulatory Authority and
requires all active MFIs to apply for a license from the MRA.212 To be considered
for a license, MFIs must complete an application and submit it to the MRA office

consensus among practitioners that lending to women is more beneficial to the family than lending to
men. See Muhammad Yunus, Social Enterprise: Doing Well by Doing Good, 1 PEPP. J. BUS.,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 99 (2007) (providing an explanation of this phenomenon); see also supra note
17.
205

See Bank of Bangladesh’s Microfinance Institutions Page, supra note 204.

206

See W.A. Wijewardena, Microfinance Policy and Regulatory Framework: Experience and
Perspective of South Asian Region – Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and India (Islamabad, Pakistan:
MicroFinance in Pakistan: Innovating & Mainstreaming Conf., 2004), available at
http://www.microfinancegateway.com/files/22945_Microfinance_Policy_and_Regulatory_Framework_
by_Wije_Wardena.pdf.
207

Id.

208

Id.

209

Id. Initially this Committee prepared a set of guidelines which were implemented by the Unit.
See Bangladesh Bank Financial System Overview, http://www.bangladesh-bank.org/fnansys/mfi.html
(last visited Mar. 11, 2009). Those guidelines helped the sector prepare for a future regulatory
environment and establish a friendly communication between the sector and the policy makers. Id.
210
Id. A full text version of the bill is available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/
37487_file_Bangladesh_Micro_Credit_Regulatory_Authority_Act_2006.pdf.
211
See Bank of Bangladesh Financial System Overview, supra note 208. The Microcredit
Regulatory Authority is an independent organization that is charged with the responsibility of
supervising and regulating the microfinance sector in Bangladesh.
212
See Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006, available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/
files/37487_file_Bangladesh_Micro_Credit_Regulatory_Authority_Act_2006.pdf.
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at the Bangladesh Bank.213 The MRA then examines the application to evaluate
the MFI’s source of funds, ownership, and internal governance.214 The law states
that all institutions engaging in microcredit operations should separate their
financial operations from other development works and keep their accounts
separate.215 The law authorizes the MRA to monitor and supervise all licensed
MFIs.216 The MRA also has the power to prepare detailed rules related to
microcredit operations, including: conditions for spending any income,
geographical areas of operations, guidelines on internal and external account
audits, collection of deposits, and use of earned profit.217 The MRA has the
mandate to take punitive measures if any institution does not comply with any of
the provisions of law and rules.218
The Microcredit Regulatory Act was passed in order to create a beneficial
environment for microfinance institutions in Bangladesh.219 For the following
reasons, the law will prove successful.
The Microcredit Regulatory Act fares well with the four suggestions for a
sound legal framework for microfinance discussed in section two of this comment.
The first suggestion encourages microfinance integration with the formal financial
sector.220 The law permits deposit mobilization, which allows institutions to raise
more capital in order to reach more clients.221 Additionally, the law encourages
future integration with the formal financial sector by requiring institutions to abide
by internationally approved accounting standards.222 The second suggestion

213
Email from Lila Rachid, Managing Director of the Microcredit Regulatory Authority (Jan. 26,
2008, 22:49 PST) (on file with author).
214
See Steven Craig, Bangladesh Micro Credit Regulatory Authority Begins Issuance of Licenses to
Microfinance Institutions, MICROCAPITAL, Aug. 15 2007, available at http://microcapitalmonitor.com/
cblog/index.php?/archives/1079-MICROCAPITAL-STORY-Bangladesh-Micro-credit-Regulatory-Auth
ority-Begins-Issuance-of-Licenses-to-Microfinance-Institutions.html#extended. The MRA determines
the type of regulation based on the institution’s source of funds. See LEDGERWOOD, supra note 130.
The MRA examines the background of executive team members and refuses to license individuals with
fraudulent or bankrupt histories. See infra note 233.
215
See Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006, available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/
files/37487_file_Bangladesh_Micro_Credit_Regulatory_Authority_Act_2006.pdf.
216

Id.

217

Id.

218

Id.

219

Id.

220

See supra note 103.

221

See supra note 110 (providing a discussion of deposit mobilization). Additionally, the law
facilitates mergers between smaller MFIs and larger banks, allowing MFIs to tap into commercial
markets through mergers. See infra note 227.
222
Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006, available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/
files/37487_file_Bangladesh_Micro_Credit_Regulatory_Authority_Act_2006.pdf. Such requirements
prepare institutions for future integration with formal financial markets because they will learn to apply
the same information systems as their counterparts in the formal sector. This will enable commercial
institutions to have confidence in the MFIs’ bookkeeping, thereby increasing their likelihood to conduct
business with the MFIs. Additionally, if MFIs and commercial institutions implement comparable
accounting systems, it will facilitate the process of MFIs merging with commercial banks. See infra
note 227.
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promotes a tiered approach to regulation.223 Under Bangladesh’s microfinance
law, MFIs are regulated differently, depending on the institution’s size.224
Minimum capital requirements are based on the institution’s geographic
outreach.225 The third suggestion encourages a legal framework that facilitates an
easy transition from NGO to formalized bank.226 While the law does not
specifically provide an easy transition from NGO to formalized bank status, it does
facilitate the process of MFIs merging with larger banks.227 Such mergers enable
MFIs to reduce costs while expanding outreach and allow banks to diversify assets
while entering new markets and increasing revenue.228 The final suggestion
discourages interest rate limits.229 The Microcredit Regulatory Act is silent on
interest rates, thereby allowing institutions and the market to determine optimal
rates.230
In addition to satisfying the four suggestions, the Microcredit Regulatory Act
contains other positive aspects for the microfinance regulatory environment in
Bangladesh. Proponents of microfinance regulation encourage policy-makers to
establish an independent body dedicated to supervising the sector.231 As noted,232

223

See supra note 125.

224

Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006, available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/
37487_file_Bangladesh_Micro_Credit_Regulatory_Authority_Act_2006.pdf.
225
See id. For example, if an institution operates in all of Bangladesh’s districts, the institution will
have a higher minimum capital requirement than one operating in just one district.
226
See supra note 139. The original bill proposal from the Microfinance Research and Reference
Unit to the government contained a provision outlining such a transition. Email from Lila Rachid,
supra note 212. The government did not approve the provision, reasoning that establishment of the
Microcredit Regulatory Authority was a bold move, and that legislation for microfinance regulation
should move one step at a time. Id. The members of parliament explained that they want to move
cautiously on microfinance regulation. After evaluating the effectiveness of the Microcredit Regulatory
Authority, parliament members will re-visit the provision for an easy transition from NGO to formal
bank status. Interview with Lila Rachid, Managing Director of the Microcredit Regulatory Authority,
in Dhaka, Bangladesh (Jun. 10, 2007). Dr. Yunus, whose Grameen Bank is the only formalized bank
conducting microfinance operations in Bangladesh, was a strong proponent of this provision. Id.
Understandably, Dr. Yunus carries tremendous political influence in the country; as such, practitioners
are optimistic that the parliament will soon adopt a provision to the law that will facilitate easy
transition from NGO to formalized bank status.
227
Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006, available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/
files/37487_file_Bangladesh_Micro_Credit_Regulatory_Authority_Act_2006.pdf.
228

See supra note 105; see also supra note 190.

229

See supra note 176.

230

Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006, available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/
files/37487_file_Bangladesh_Micro_Credit_Regulatory_Authority_Act_2006.pdf. It has long been the
policy of the Bangladesh Bank to allow financial service providers to compete freely regarding interest
rates. See Bank of Bangladesh, http://www.bangladesh-bank.org/fnansys/fnansys.html.
231
See, e.g., COUNTS & SOBHAN, supra note 43 (proposing central banks establish an independent
supervisory body to regulate the microfinance sector). The rationale for this argument is rooted in the
complexity of microfinance regulation. It is difficult for a banking supervisory body to regulate the
commercial banking sector as well as microfinance. See id. Microfinance regulation is a daunting task,
and involves detailed analysis of thousands of institutions. As of January 2008, the MRA had received
applications from 4,000 institutions. Email from Lila Rachid, supra note 212. The MRA follows a
thorough process before granting a license. For instance, the MRA considers whether the institution has
followed the detailed registration requirements of the Microcredit Regulatory Act; whether the
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the Microcredit Regulatory Act established the Microcredit Regulatory Authority,
an independent microfinance supervisor. The law also promotes institutional
transparency and stability of the microfinance sector. Under the law, no executive
of an institution can have an unlawful or even a financially unstable
background.233 Each institution must abide by internationally recognized
accounting standards and submit annual financial statements to the MRA.234
While there is no requirement of minimum capital adequacy, the MRA notes the
importance of establishing minimum liquid reserve requirements.235 Finally, each
institution is required to establish a reserve fund, so as to ensure long-term
solvency.236 The principles of the Act enable the institutions to thrive financially,
protect the MFIs’ borrowers and promote stability in the microfinance sector. As
such the Microcredit Regulatory Act provides a model for other countries to
follow.
V.

CONCLUSION

Will the eighty to ninety percent of the population who are excluded from
the formal banking sector in developing countries be able to receive financial
services? The answer depends in large part on whether sound legal frameworks
for microfinance are established. There are many costs and benefits to
microfinance regulation. Balancing the two, the benefits outweigh the costs, so
long as sound practices are followed.237 As countries undertake efforts to establish
a framework for microfinance, the Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006 is an
example of an effective law that will provide a favorable legal framework for
microfinance.

institution has bona fide operations at the field level; whether it has adopted approved accounting and
management information systems; and whether it has a properly functioning executive body. Id.
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See supra note 200.
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Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006, available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/
37487_file_Bangladesh_Micro_Credit_Regulatory_Authority_Act_2006.pdf. In addition, the MRA
can pass a written order for an executive to step down if he or she is involved in prejudicial practices, or
if he or she causes any public harm. Id. Each executive must submit, on behalf of the institution, a
constitution to the MRA and the MRA must approve any changes to the document. Id.
234

Id. The MRA has the authority to see any documents and visit any projects it deems necessary.
Id. The MRA also has liberal permission to impose fines and it can even seize documents if there is any
suspicious activity. Id.
235

Email from Lila Rachid, supra note 212; see also Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006, available
at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/37487_file_Bangladesh_Micro_Credit_Regulatory_Autho
rity_Act_2006.pdf. A minimum liquid reserve requirement serves the purpose of ensuring the overall
solvency of the institution, by requiring the institution to maintain a certain percentage of its total
capital in liquid form. Commentators suggest that minimum standard liquidity requirements for
microfinance should not exceed 25%. See, e.g., COUNTS & SOBHAN, supra note 43.
236
Id. A reserve fund is a safety net for the institution, and requirements typically require financial
institutions to maintain a certain percentage of its total assets in the fund. See LEDGERWOOD, supra
note 130.
237
For example, practices such as those outlined in section II of this comment: Microfinance
services should be integrated with the formal financial sector; regulation should be based on a tiered
approach; the framework should facilitate an easy transition from NGO to formalized bank status; and
there should be no interest rate cap. It should be noted that this list of four suggestions is not exhaustive.

